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An understandable clamor occurred following the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC, which solidified the ministerial exception under the First Amend-
ment. The exception, according to the Court, affords certain religious enti-
ties significant institutional autonomy under the Religion Clauses. The
decision, short on details regarding the content of the exception, led to
much speculation about outcomes in future litigation. This Article is the
first attempt at assessing whether the chief criticisms of the decision-its
potential breadth and inherent ambiguity-have led to divergent, incoher-
ent, and unjustifiable results. It observes that neither the warnings of the
decision's critics nor the hopes of the decision's proponents have fully ma-
terialized. Rather, the actions of lower courts following Hosanna-Tabor are
somewhat predictable; courts have reached divergent conclusions while
emphasizing the same parts of the Court's opinion, and have struggled ade-
quately to define both aspects of the exception, namely which entities may
invoke it and which employees constitute ministers. This Article ultimately
suggests that, although the language of Hosanna-Tabor suggests a link,
courts are failing adequately to comprehend the connection between those
two inquiries. As such, the Article proposes a workable analytical frame-
work that links both inquiries and that is faithful to the doctrinal basis for
the exception outlined by the Court. It argues that the scope of the defini-
tion of "minister" should correspond to the type of entity that seeks appli-
cation of the exception. It suggests that who is a minister in a particular
context depends on what type of ministry the entity in question engages in
and whether it can be said that the entity, as a whole, is engaging in relig-
ious activity when the employee acts. This approach differs from the ap-
proaches of many lower courts post-Hosanna-Tabor, which tend to focus
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on the individual activities of the employee within the institution rather
than whether the employee's activities are institutional in nature.
INTRODUCTION
ff OSANNA-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC ("Hosanna-Tabor")' solidified the ministerial exception
to anti-discrimination employment statutes that seek to regulate
the hiring and firing process and terms and conditions of employment. 2
Moving forward, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment unequivo-
cally recognize the autonomy of religious entities3 to invoke the excep-
tion as an affirmative defense in employment discrimination litigation.4
At its core, the exception prevents the government from interfering with
the internal governance of a religious entity insofar as it relates to minis-
ters within the entity.5
Following the decision, some commentators expressed concern at the
Court's willingness to so easily dismiss duly-enacted, popularly sup-
ported, anti-discrimination laws that target unlawful discrimination.6
Some expressed the fear that religious entities would go rogue and sub-
vert generally applicable laws that have noble objectives. 7 These concerns
have been more formally expressed in scholarship and existed before the
Court's decision as well.8 In contrast, proponents of institutional religious
autonomy9 deemed the outcome to be sound, and ultimately let out a sigh
1. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
2. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
3. I use the phrase "religious entity" in this Article to refer to those entities that
might be capable of invoking the exception. This ambiguity stems from the Court's unwill-
ingness to clarify which entities are in fact capable of using the exception. See infra Part
I.C. "Entity" may include churches, organizations, institutions, and groups.
4. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 ("We conclude that the exception operates as
an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.").
5. Id. at 702 ("Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the
decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.").
6. See Howard Friedman, Analysis: Some Thoughts on Church Autonomy After To-
day's Hosanna-Tabor Decision, RELIGION CLAUSE, (Jan. 11, 2012) [http://perma.cc/YZ2N-
D2KVI.
7. Hosanna-Tabor and Religion Clause Anarchy, RELIGIOUS LEFT LAW, [http:/
perma.cc//2u92-66k9].
8. See also Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Minis-
terial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007) (arguing
that religion is not privileged under contemporary First Amendment doctrine); Jane Ruth-
erford, Equality As the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment
Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1049 (1996). See generally Richard
Schragger & Micah Schwartzmann, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917
(2013).
9. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 63 (2011); Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC.
THOUGHT 59, 64 (2007); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1981) (recognizing how churches have a right to be free from
government interference).
1124 [Vol. 68
Tale of Two Inquiries
of relief, after years of wondering whether the Court would legitimize the
consensus that had developed at the circuit court level.10
The Court spoke unanimously, thereby rendering the ministerial excep-
tion an aspect of First Amendment jurisprudence that is here to stay.
While the Court solidified the ministerial exception somewhat differently
than the lower courts,1 it also answered the broader question of whether
the First Amendment provides special solace to the value of institutional
autonomy. That answer was a resounding yes, although scholars disagree
about its ultimate foundation. 12
Following Hosanna-Tabor, courts have attempted to apply the Court's
language regarding the ministerial exception.13 Somewhat predictably,
the Court's vague characterization of the exception and its content has
rendered this exercise difficult. Lower courts have struggled with the task
of fleshing out the meaning of the exception, in practice, thereby produc-
ing divergent results.' 4 While this type of result holds true for most broad
doctrinal pronouncements made by the Court, and the Court itself ac-
knowledged that its opinion was short on details,15 the stakes are high
given the intrinsically contentious nature of the two areas of law impli-
cated by the ministerial exception: religious freedom and protections
against employment discrimination that have been around for fifty years.
In other words, those who advocate for broad institutional autonomy
tend to strongly guard the liberty recognized by the Court, 16 while those
who litigate discrimination claims tend to prioritize the goods associated
with resolving unjust employment actions over other constitutional
values.' 7
10. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Religious Groups Greet Ruling with Satisfaction, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2012), [http://perma.cc/3P79-J48N]; Thomas Messner, Supreme Court Deci-
sion in Hosanna-Tabor A Major Win for Religious Freedom, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Jan. 11,
2012), [http://perma.cc/9CMG-CB3R] ("For several reasons, the Court's ruling is a
landmark victory for religious freedom."). A few weeks after the Court's decision, the
Obama Administration announced its decision regarding a controversial Dept. of Health
and Human Services mandate for contraceptive services under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Health Care Act. Journalists were quick to apply the spirit of deference in
Hosanna-Tabor to the controversy and supporters of last summer's decision in Hobby
Lobby v. Burwell cited the same when supporting the decision. See, e.g., Horace Cooper,
The Birth Control Mandate Is Unconstitutional, NAT'L POLICY ANALYSIS (Feb. 2012),
[http://perma.cc/JS7G-WPMM].
11. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (citing several circuit courts that had found the
ministerial exception).
12. See Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Under-
standing of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008); Paul Horwitz, Defending(Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049,1053 (2013); Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-
Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 839 (2012).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See Katherine Hinkle, What's in a Name? The Definition of "Minister" in Ho-
sanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 288 (2013).
15. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
16. See Lund, supra note 9.
17. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 8, at 918-20 (2013) (arguing against special
rights and autonomy for religious institutions); Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization's
Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13
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This Article is the first to assess the early results following Hosanna-
Tabor and reflect on how those results will and should inform future pro-
nouncements by the Court related to the ministerial exception. Although
it has been only three years since the Court announced its decision, the
opinion has been cited in over one hundred cases. 18 Many of these cases
address the precise issues at stake with the ministerial exception: which
entities may invoke it as a defense and which employees qualify as minis-
ters, although many more cases focus on the latter inquiry, often without
reference to the preceding issue. 19 Thus, lower courts generally have ap-
proached these separate, but intertwined, inquiries differently; some have
recognized them as analytically distinct whereas other courts have im-
pliedly acknowledged that they are two sides of the same coin and there-
fore inseparable.20 Different focuses understandably have led to different
outcomes and that oversight is addressed in Part III.
The structure of the Article is as follows: Part I will outline the specific
contribution of Hosanna-Tabor following decades of circuit court deci-
sions that already recognized the ministerial exception. It pays special at-
tention to the Court's statements regarding the definition of minister,
and, interestingly, its lack of clarity regarding which entities may invoke
the exception,21 an inquiry that would seem to precede the other. Part II
explains how lower courts are applying Hosanna-Tabor. It acknowledges
attempted extensions of Hosanna-Tabor as well as attempted restraints
and identifies where courts are struggling to flesh out the Court's deci-
sion. It also discusses the cases in light of the two inquires within the
exception. Part III critically reflects on the difficulties of lower courts and
proposes an analytical framework that links the inquiry of who qualifies
as a minister to the more foundational question of what type of entity is
attempting to invoke the exception. It ultimately suggests that the Court
should clearly enunciate that who qualifies as a minister is contingent on
the religious attributes, mission, and institutional activities of the entity in
question. In other words, awareness of an entity's ministry is essential to
determining whether an employee is acting as a minister.
I. THE CONTENT OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
Prior to the Court's announcement in Hosanna-Tabor, the ministerial
exception existed at the federal circuit level and in various state jurisdic-
ENGAGE 114, 118 (2012) (cautioning that Hosanna-Tabor could leave "religion unregu-
lated and out of control").
18. A simple citing references search on Westlaw at the time of this draft yielded one
hundred and eight indexed cases that have cited Hosanna-Tabor.
19. See, e.g., Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. II. 2012);
Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012).
20. See Kyle R. Cummins, The Intersection of CLS and Hosanna-Tabor: The Ministe-
rial Exception Applied to Religious Student Organizations, 44 U. MEM. L. REv. 141, 177
(2013).
21. See Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. PUB. POL'Y
493, 494 (2012); see also Zoe Robinson, What is a "Religious Institution"?, 55 B.C. L. REv.
181, 183 (2014).
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tions.22 Keeping with the trend, Hosanna-Tabor solidified the ministerial
exception as a product of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
But before discussing how lower courts are following Hosanna-Tabor, it
is necessary to grasp what the Court actually announced in its opinion.
The opinion came in broad strokes and provided very little guidance for
lower courts. This holds for both the values underlying the exception and
the bases for the doctrine ultimately communicated by the Court. Thus,
this Part will begin with a discussion of the broader values articulated by
the Court. Then it will articulate the precise statements made by the
Court with respect to the content of the ministerial exception and recog-
nize where the Court's language lays the seeds for the actions of lower
courts.
A. DOCTRINAL BASES FOR THE EXCEPTION
The Court emphatically announced that both Religion Clauses support
the exception. 23 More pointedly, the Court acknowledged that conflicts
between religious entities and anti-discrimination norms must be viewed
through the prism of liberty rather than equality.24 The Free Exercise
Clause protects against state intrusion into the internal governance of a
religious entity, particularly the selecting of ministers. 25 The Establish-
ment Clause also forbids government involvement in the decisions that
the ministerial exception protects. 26 After Hosanna-Tabor, it is undenia-
ble that institutional religious autonomy is a matter of constitutional
law.
2 7
A combination of the historical relationship between the institutional
church and state, both in the United States and England; precedent; and
22. See, e.g., Natal v. Christian and Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989);
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-07 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800-01 (4th Cir. 2000); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474
F.3d 223, 225-27 (6th Cir. 2007); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.
2008); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir.
1991).
23. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702 ("Both Religion Clauses bar the government
from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.").
24. Hosanna-Tabor concludes with the following statements: "When a minister who
has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First
Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who
will guide it on its way." Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 706 ("The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their
ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a
church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of con-
trol over the selection of those will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister,
the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to
shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.").
26. Id. ("According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to
the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involve-
ment in such ecclesiastical decisions.").
27. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 182 n.4 ("Post-Hosanna-Tabor, if a litigant can
show that it is a 'religious institution,' it is entitled to a First Amendment right to absolute
constitutional protection for any activity covered by the institutional right.").
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consensus at the circuit court level formed the basis of the majority opin-
ion. Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the First Amendment religion
clauses are the offspring of historical conflict between the church and the
state. 28 The tortuous relationship between the English Crown and the
state church motivated the founders to locate institutional autonomy in
the Religion Clauses, unthreatened by secular authority, and thereby pre-
clude the state from interfering with the internal governance of religious
entities.29
According to the Court, that intention served as the basis for its rulings
in prior church autonomy cases, particularly in the context of property
disputes.30 The church property cases, while recognizing the impropriety
of governmental interference, suggest more broadly that interference, per
se, is suspect. It took only a small step to extend the logic of those cases
to the conclusion that it is "impermissible for the government to contra-
dict a church's determination of who can act as its ministers. '31 If internal
property disputes are off limits, then the decision about who to employ as
a teacher of doctrine and a representative of the church is as well. This
history, precedent, and the consensus held by the circuit courts 32 formed
the doctrinal basis for the majority opinion.
Notably, despite the Court's apparent confidence in a firm doctrinal
basis, the Court felt it necessary to qualify the breadth of its holding.
Significantly, it made no comment on the horizontal reach of the excep-
tion, particularly to other types of discrimination claims and common law
contract and tort claims.33 The Court was reluctant to engender confusion
on this point, thereby anticipating future litigation involving issues be-
yond the content of the exception.
B. GUIDANCE FOR DEFINING "MINISTER"
While Hosanna-Tabor is first known for solidifying the ministerial ex-
ception as a viable constitutional principle, perhaps the most significant
aspect of the decision is what it did not say. The lack of clarity regarding
the definition of minister is impossible to avoid given that the Court com-
municated its unwillingness to adopt a "rigid formula" for this inquiry.34
Instead, the Court simply felt comfortable declaring that the employee
28. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702-04.
29. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 ("By forbidding the 'establishment of religion'
and guaranteeing the 'free exercise thereof,' the Religion Clauses ensured that the new
Federal Government-unlike the English Crown-would have no role in filling ecclesiasti-
cal offices.").
30. Id. at 704-05.
31. Id. at 704.
32. Id. at 705 ("[T]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a
'ministerial exception,' grounded in the First Amendment.").
33. Id. at 710 ("We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits,
including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their
religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception
to other circumstances if and when they arise.").
34. Id. at 697.
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met an unarticulated standard. 35
In fairness, the Court did offer a few considerations for lower courts to
ponder, particularly "the formal title given ... by the Church, the sub-
stance reflected in that title ... [the employee's] use of that title, and the
important religious functions ... performed for the Church. ' ' 36 But the
Court did not unpack each of these considerations and lower courts are
attempting to do so as we speak.37 Instead, the majority opinion only
elaborated slightly on the issue of one's title as well as job functions. Ac-
cording to the Court, an employee's title alone is insufficient to qualify
one as a minister.38 However, the Court was receptive to the notion that
how an entity classifies an employee is relevant. 39 Thus, when a religious
entity gives an employee a title that connotes a ministerial position, the
Court suggests that lower courts should take that classification into ac-
count. Precisely how much remains unclear, but that answer is tempered
by the Court's overarching language that title alone is not dispositive.
Regardless, the Court implies a spirit of deference to religious entities on
the issue of title and seemingly concedes a degree of subjectivity to this
inquiry, cloaked in deference. 40
The Court also made sure to clarify examinations into the functions of
employees as many circuit courts had applied the primary duties test
when analyzing cases under the ministerial exception.41 According to the
Court, error occurs when a court focuses too much on the time an em-
ployee spends on secular duties. 42 Rather, the existence of secular duties
does not preclude application of the exception.43 Swinging the pendulum
the other way, the Court announced that the mere presence of some re-
ligious functions assists the cause for ministerial classification.4" In fact,
secular functions should be viewed in light of religious functions, not the
35. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 ("It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first
case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the
circumstances of her employment.").
36. Id.
37. See infra Part II.
38. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
39. Id. ("Although such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the
fact that an employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely
relevant.").
40. The crux of Justice Thomas's concurring opinion concerns this issue. For Justice
Thomas, the question of whether an employee is a minister is "itself religious in nature."
Id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring). Cognizant of establishment concerns, Justice Thomas
worries that judicial definitions of minister will chill religious expression by inadvertently
forcing religious entities to conform their definitions: "[U]ncertainty about whether its
ministerial designation will be rejected, and a corresponding fear of liability, may cause a
religious group to conform its beliefs and practices regarding 'ministers' to the prevailing
secular understanding." Id. at 710-11. Hence, Justice Thomas calls for significantly more
deference to the entity's classification of the employee, tempered by "good-faith." Id. at
710. On a side note, it is unclear why Justice Thomas, seeing as he does not define "good-
faith," refrains from viewing the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar instead of an
affirmative defense. The logic of his position would seem to support that view.






other way around: "The amount of time an employee spends on particu-
lar activities is relevant in assessing that employee's status, but that factor
cannot be considered in isolation, without regard to the nature of the
religious functions performed and the other considerations discussed
above."'45 The Court seemed to suggest that whether someone is a minis-
ter or not should be viewed through the prism of the values underlying
the exception in the first place, as well as the four factors identified ear-
lier in its opinion, although it did not clarify what it meant by "other
considerations." 46
That ambiguity continued when the Court also tied the idea of religious
functions to the notion that such an employee has a "role in conveying
the Church's message and carrying out its mission. '47 The Court reiter-
ated this concept when summarizing the purpose of the exception, stating
that it "ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister
to the faithful . . . is the church's alone."'48 Interestingly, these statements
would seem consistent insofar as they identify ministers as wedded to the
message and mission of the religious entity. But the interpretation could
proceed in a few different directions. First, this understanding has the
potential to broaden who may be classified as a minister as the communi-
cation of a message and pursuit of a mission could extend to a range of
activities beyond church walls. Alternatively, the statement could be con-
strued to narrow the breadth of the exception as not all religious entities
are in the business of primarily sending messages, at least not like
churches. Finally, the latter statement also could be construed to narrow
the definition of minister to those who represent the entity to co-religion-
ists, adherents, or members of the particular entity. Regardless of which
direction the Court intended, there is a lack of clarity about the connec-
tion between the two inquiries within the exception, and the uncertainty
has affected the lower courts.
Although the Court provided scant guidance with respect to who quali-
fies as a minister, it did clarify that the exception could extend to employ-
ment actions based on non-religious reasons. 49 In other words, the
purpose of the exception is to safeguard a church's decision about its in-
ternal affairs, full stop, regardless of the motivations. 50 The exception ex-
ists to emphasize the ability to decide as an institution, irrespective of
"judicial second-guess[ing]. "51 When considering the ambiguity surround-
ing the definition of minister, and the Court's comment that the excep-
tion may cover employment decisions without a religious motivation, 52
45. Id. at 709.
46. For example, does the Court mean the values serving as the doctrinal basis of the
opinion, or simply the factors it used to analyze Perich's status as an employee?
47. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 698.
48. Id. at 709.
49. Id. ("The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a
minister only when it is made for a religious reason.").
50. Id.
51. Id. at 716.
52. Id. at 698.
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the exception as crafted leaves religious employers with ample discretion.
And although the Court refers to internal decision-making, "internal" is
not defined and the effects of such decisions still can be felt beyond the
entity's walls.5 3
Justice Alito's contributions, expressed in his concurring opinion, de-
serve mention because, as will be demonstrated below, lower courts are
struggling to separate the "who-is-a-minister" inquiry from the type of
institution that is invoking the exception as a defense.5 4 Perhaps foresee-
ing this analytical difficulty, Justice Alito called for a definition that leans
on function rather than title due to the diversity in form and type when it
comes to ministers.55 For Alito, the exception should be tailored to "any
'employee' who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services
or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or
teacher of its faith."' 56 It is easy to see how these considerations would
potentially catch more employees by remaining cognizant of the function
of the underlying institution. Although the statement uses language that
describes formal churches, or their analogue, the statement suggests that
employees at parachurches, and religiously affiliated organizations, such
as schools or universities, might be labeled ministers under some circum-
stances. Alito's recognition that ministers can communicate to non-adher-
ents also supports this point given that lots of religious entities have
missions devoted to serving non-adherents. 57 As discussed below, Alito's
attempt to craft a standard that is cognizant of the diversity of form
amongst religious entities anticipated the struggles of the lower courts.
C. ASSUMPTION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Hosanna-Tabor rested on a massive assumption, namely that the
school in question, affiliated with a church, was the type of religious en-
tity capable of having ministers.58 The ambiguity began at the start of the
opinion, which chose to characterize the school as a "religious group." 59
The Court proceeded to use that phrase seven times in its opinion.60
More significantly, the Court used that phrase and multiple others synon-
ymously, interchanging church, religious group, religious organization, re-
53. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705-07.
54. See id. at 711-16 (Alito, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 711
56. Id. at 712
57. Id. at 713 ("A religious body's control over such 'employees' is an essential compo-
nent of its freedom to speak in its own voice, both to its own members and to the outside
world.").
58. See Murray, supra note 21, at 496-97. In fairness, this issue was not a question
presented before the Court. See Hosanna-Taber, 132 S. Ct. at 699-710 (majority opinion).
But the absence of any recognition of the potential issue renders the guidance the Court
seeks to provide regarding who is a minister less helpful.
59. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699.
60. See id. 699-70.
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ligious institution, and religious employer.61
Treating these terms synonymously occurs at various points of the
opinion, including the historical discussion that precedes the holding and
its application to the facts before the Court.62 According to the Court,
deciphering the relationship between church and state involves delineat-
ing the line between the government and a "religious group. '63 But the
Court's historical discussion focuses entirely on the relationship between
a church proper-the Church of England-and its government counter-
part.64 The discussions of precedent also focus on hierarchical churches
and congregations. 65 In other words, while the Court seems to impliedly
connect the concept of a church to places of worship, it simultaneously
uses different words without explanation to describe entities possibly in-
cluded in the exception.66 The key passage affirming the existence of the
ministerial exception is a microcosm of the ambiguity plaguing the
opinion:
We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of
a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Re-
quiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punish-
ing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal gov-
ernance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selec-
tion of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted
minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects
a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through
its appointments.67
The majority opinion confuses its future audience even more when de-
claring, at the end of its decision, that "the ministerial exception is not
limited to the head of a religious congregation. ' 68 If not purely a protec-
tion for churches and houses of worship, then to whom does it extend to,
and to which entities must they belong?
The consequence of using similar but distinct language is that the Court
never acknowledges an analytical inquiry inherent in the concept of the
ministerial exception, namely which entities may invoke the exception.
And that shortcoming by definition disallowed any statements about a
possible connection between the two aspects of the exception. Although
61. See id. Specifically, the Court uses "church" over forty times, "religious group"
seven times, "religious organization" seven times, "religious institution" three times, and
"religious employer" three times. See id.
62. Id. at 702-04.
63. Id. at 702 ("Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the
decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.").
64. Id. at 702-04.
65. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704-05.
66. Murray, supra note 21, at 502 ("Roberts, while solely highlighting formal
'churches' in this history, interestingly summarizes this section by stating 'the Free Exercise
Clause prevents [the government] from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to
select their own."').
67. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 707.
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neither of the parties challenged the religious quality of the school in
question, the Court's language fails to account for that possibility.69
While it is possible that the Court's language could have been purpose-
fully broad, in an effort to cast a wide net, that seems unlikely given that a
deferential definition for entities would run up against the concerns
shared by the majority in Employment Division v. Smith,70 particularly
entities becoming laws unto themselves. 71 Notably, reading between the
tealeaves in Justice Alito's opinion suggests that he is open to a broad
definition of religious entity for purposes of the exception.72 He barely
uses the word "church."
The import of these ambiguities is that lower courts have even less gui-
dance on this issue than what exists for determining who is a minister.
Aside from Justice Alito's opinion, a possible link between the two in-
quiries was never explicitly discussed by the Court, although it would
seem that both inquiries are two sides of the same coin, or at least re-
lated, given that what a minister does will in theory be connected to the
type of entity he or she is associated with on a daily basis.73 Hence, deter-
mining the precise religious attributes of an entity attempting to invoke
the exception could be essential to making the ministerial exception
workable. Fortunately, some courts are already engaging in this task, as
the issue is ripe given the prevalence of unconventional religious entities
and religiously-affiliated institutions that engage in significant activities
that mirror the work of secular organizations. 74 The next section aims to
report the results of these decisions.
II. LOWER COURT APPLICATION OF HOSANNA-TABOR
While Hosanna-Tabor solidified the ministerial exception as a matter
of federal constitutional law, lower courts generally have been cautious
when confronted with novel theories of its relevance to particular claims.
69. Id. at 694-716 (majority opinion).
70. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, Pub. C. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853
(2015).
71. See Murray, supra note 21 at 523-25 (noting how "the Court cannot extend the
deference that it shows religious institutions with regard to internal affairs to the threshold
issue of whether the organization is religious" because "[t]o do so would violate its own
characterization of Smith").
72. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701-16 (Alito, J., concurring). For example,
when Justice Alito discusses the history that the majority relies on in its opinion, he refers
to the entities as "religious bodies" rather than churches. Id. at 712. Additionally, when
discussing the content of the word "minister," Justice Alito links ministers to "religious
organizations." Finally, his focus on functions for defining minister stems from his belief
that functionality relates to institutional autonomy, thereby implying that the mission or
function of an entity will color who may be classified as a minister: "The protection of the
First Amendment to roles of religious leadership, worship, ritual, and expression focuses
on the objective functions that are important for the autonomy of any religious group,
regardless of its beliefs." See id. (emphasis added).
73. See id. at 711-16 (Justice Alito uses the word "church," or some variation thereof,
twenty-one times in his concurrence.).
74. See Murray, supra note 21, at 508, 510-13.
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For example, the exception has not been extended to tortious conduct
such as clergy-abuse claims.75 Courts are divided on whether the excep-
tion applies to private contract claims, with some going that far.76 Specifi-
cally, in DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation,77 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court concluded that judicial adjudication of a contract dispute between
an employee and an entity that would be capable of invoking the excep-
tion in a statutory context would involve the type of state action that
implicates the Religion Clauses. 78 In other words, judicial review and en-
forcement of a private contract is state action that may allow for applica-
tion of the exception despite the absence of a statute. 79
Most significantly for purposes of this Article, lower courts have strug-
gled to articulate the content of the exception, including which entities it
applies to and which employees may be classified as ministers within
those entities.80 Courts are split between those who recognize the two-
part inquiry associated with the ministerial exception and those that do
not, although the reasons for refraining from acknowledging both inquir-
75. See, e.g., Doe v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1225,
1231-32 (E.D. Wash. 2013) (noting how Hosanna-Tabor restricts its holding to claims of
employment discrimination and does not include negligent hiring claims as they relate to
tortious conduct); Givens v. St. Adalbert Church, No. HHDCV126032459S, 2013 WL
4420776, at *7-8 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 2013); Doe No. 2 v. Norwich Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX07CV125036425S, 2013 WL 3871430, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 8, 2013). But see Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357, 365-67,
370-71, 373-75 (Wash. 2012) (barring negligent hiring and supervision claims, but not in-
volving clergy-abuse).
76. See, e.g., DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 890 (Wis. 2012)(barring wrongful termination and breach of contract claims against Catholic parish in the
Archdiocese of Milwaukee because court would have to examine why the church termi-
nated the employee under the contract); Simons v. Ron Lewis, No. A-4600-12T2, 2014 WL
4916616, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 9 2014) (noting that Hosanna-Tabor bars
interpretation of church by-laws as they relate to hiring and firing); Mills v. Standing Gen.
Comm'n on Christian Unity, 117 A.D.3d 509, 509-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (barring
wrongful termination contract claim); Reese v. Gen. Assembly of Faith Cumberland Pres-
byterian Church in Am., 425 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2014, no pet.) (breach of
contract and other torts). Contra Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 295, 299, 307,
310 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that exception does not apply to private contracts); Yong Pyo
Hong v. Life Univ., B226987, 2012 WL 882518, at *9 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2012)(noting that ministerial exception only applies to employment statutes).
77. DeBruin, 816 N.W.2d at 878.
78. Id. at 885-86, 888-90 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). The Wis-
consin Supreme Court stated: "Where a plaintiff alleges that her termination was based on
an improper reason, it does not matter whether she seeks damages based on a contract
theory or a statutory theory. In either case, the State is effectively enjoined by the First
Amendment from interfering with the religious institution's right to choose its own minis-
ters." Id. at 889.
79. Id. at 887-90. The DeBruin court writes: "When a ministerial employee is termi-
nated, the religious institution's decision about who shall teach its faith and how that shall
be done are intertwined with the decision to terminate the employee. Courts can have no
role in affirming or overturning such a decision based on the reason why the religious
institution terminated the employment . . . The First Amendment gives St. Patrick the
absolute right to terminate DeBruin for any reason, or for no reason, as it freely exercises
its religious views." Id. at 887-88.
80. See Murray, supra note 21, at 510-11; cases cited infra note 84.
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ies are unclear.81 Nevertheless, the general theme is that courts concede
that Hosanna-Tabor does little more than legitimize the exception as a
matter of constitutional law. A details vacuum has ensued and, to fill the
void, courts are attempting to emphasize what they perceive to be the
most relevant factors of the analysis, and, in some instances, adding meat
to the bones of the Court's opinion. The following two sections discuss
the divergent results despite similar approaches amongst courts.
A. DEFINING "MINISTER"
Lower courts have been willing to extend the label of minister, post-
Hosanna-Tabor, to traditionally liturgical positions,8 2 as well as employ-
ees that further the mission of an entity by helping to convey the entity's
message, even if the job functions of the employee are not exclusively
religious. 83 The results seem to follow from Hosanna-Tabor's subtle pref-
erence for a totality of the circumstances, multi-factored approach to the
inquiry and its emphasis on how the employee relates to the mission of
the entity.84 The approach has blessed extension of the minister classifica-
tion to employees that are not involved in the leadership of the entity,
thereby legitimizing some decisions that occurred pre-Hosanna-Tabor.85
1. Employees at Church-like Entities
Hence, non-leadership employees who engage in activities that connect
to the overall religious message of such entities, especially an entity that
is inherently religious, like a church proper, have been classified as minis-
ters. For example, the music director of a Catholic parish, who played the
piano at Mass, was found to be a minister. 86 The act of playing the piano,
while not inherently religious, occurred within an exclusively religious
setting.87 Performances within this setting contributed to conveying the
message of the entity because the job responsibilities were an "important
function during the service," which is the primary means by which the
Church conveys its message. 88 Despite little to no leadership responsibili-
81. For example, in some cases one of the parties concedes one of the inquiries or
chooses not to challenge the religiosity of the particular institution. See Hosanna-Tabor,
132 S. Ct. at 694-713.
82. See, e.g., Saunders v. Richardson, No. 5:12-CV-511-FL, 2013 WL 4008184, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2013) (holding that clergyman at African Methodist Episcopal Church
was a minister).
83. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708-09.
84. Accord Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 175-76 (5th Cir.
2012) (recognizing that the three-part test within circuit that had existed pre-Hosanna-
Tabor cannot apply now because Hosanna-Tabor recognizes inherent diversity in the defi-
nition of "minister").
85. In fairness, some courts had already walked this line prior to Hosanna-Tabor. See,
e.g., Archdiocese of Wash. v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659, 677 (Md. 2007) (organist was not a
minister); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999) (music director was
minister).
86. Cannata, 700 F.3d at 177.




ties,89 no theological training,90 and responsibilities that extended almost
entirely to the logistical and administrative aspects of the position,91 the
employee could still be classified as a minister given the connection of
those activities to furthering the message of the entity.92 The fact that the
activities engaged in by the employee were not inherently religious was
immaterial given the setting in which those activities were performed and
their importance to propagating the message of the entity.93
But not all courts extend this logic down the line to any and every
employee. For a Federal District Court in Maryland, in Davis v. Balti-
more Hebrew Congregation,94 the minister label did not apply to a facili-
ties manager whose responsibilities were almost exclusively janitorial. 95
The facilities manager had "'direct responsibility for all maintenance, re-
pair, custodial, janitorial aspects of the Temple building, other facilities
and grounds, including electrical, plumbing, carpentry, cabinet work,
painting, purchasing material, and supervising staff." 96 For the court,
these duties were "entirely secular."' 97 The fact that they occurred within
a religious setting-or perhaps more appropriately described as touching a
religious setting-did not matter.98 When compared with Cannata, the
missing component appears to be a connection to conveying the message
of the entity beyond a but-for like causation sense.99 Whereas the music
director in Cannata participated in liturgical and spiritual activities that
actively promoted the message of the entity, the facilities manager in Bal-
timore Hebrew Congregation was a maintenance employee whose work
never touched the functions of the entity beyond a physical sense.' 00 This
logic was followed by another District Court in North Carolina where an
administrative assistant's "duties were not considered 'important to the
spiritual and pastoral mission of the church."'"'u In short, these cases
seem to teach that within church-like entities, job responsibilities that are
not exclusively religious, or even downright secular, may still support a
minister classification if the responsibilities help convey the spiritual mes-
89. Id. at 171, 173, 177-78 (noting that ministers can be remote from central leadership
of entity).
90. Id. at 171, 177-78 (noting how employee did not have requisite education, training,
and experience to coordinate liturgical activities).
91. Id. at 171 (explaining how the music director oversaw the budget, managed sound
systems, and maintained musical equipment).
92. Id. at 177.
93. Id.
94. Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701 (D. Md. 2013).
95. Id. at 711.
96. Id. at 707 (quoting PL.'s Opp. Ex. 6, No. 15-17).
97. Id. at 711.
98. Id.
99. Id.; cf Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177 (5th Cir. 2012).
100. Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701, 711 (D. Md. 2013)
(noting how the manager's "function as Facilities Manager was not 'important' to the De-
fendant's religious mission in the sense contemplated" by earlier Fourth Circuit cases); cf
Cannata, 700 F.3d at 177.
101. McCallum v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass'n, No. 3:09CV381-RLV, 2012 WL
4756061, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2012).
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sage of the entity beyond simply being a necessary physical condition for
any type of message giving. Piano playing during Mass helps communi-
cate the religious aspect of the message because music is an integral part
of conveying the religious message; in contrast, maintaining the physical
space by which religious activity is made possible is no different from
maintaining a space that is not religious.
2. Cases at Religiously-affiliated Educational Entities
Courts have tried to import the idea of an employee contributing to
conveying the message of an entity in the cases involving religiously affili-
ated schools. These entities are one step removed from churches and
their parallels because they engage in activity that many non-religious en-
tities also engage in, namely educating, including in secular subjects. Pre-
Hosanna-Tabor, lower courts struggled with classifying teachers at relig-
ious schools. 10 2 Since the decision, a few courts have been willing to clas-
sify teachers of religious subjects at exclusively religious schools as
ministers, 10 3 but courts continue to struggle, especially in light of the fact
that Hosanna-Tabor involved a "called teacher. ' 10 4 The task is even more
difficult given that primary school teachers often have duties that blur the
line between the purely secular and religious.
One of the first cases to tackle the issue was Herzog v. St. Peter Lu-
theran Church.'0 5 Herzog involved an elementary school, "lay"
teacher,10 6 who was "called" to the ministry,10 7 recognized by the congre-
gation as such,10 8 and who claimed a special income tax exemption for
ministers. 10 9 As for her teaching responsibilities, she taught secular sub-
jects. 1 0 Although the teaching handbook asked all teachers to incorpo-
rate religious instruction, she stated that she never did."' With that said,
she also taught religion classes, attended church services with her class,
and led one church service each year." 2
102. See Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211,
220-22 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 849, 852-53 (S.D. Ind. 1998); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166,
171-72 (2d Cir. 1993); Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 768
N.W.2d 868, 880-84 (Wis. 2009).
103. See, e.g., Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997, 1000-03 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (assumed to
be a minister, although case involves discussion of ecclesiastical abstention doctrine); Tem-
ple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 975 N.E.2d 433, 442-43
(Mass. 2012) (teacher of religious subjects at after school religious school that also met on
Sundays).
104. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694.
105. 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
106. Id. at 669.
107. Id. As a called teacher, she must "perform all duties of her office according to the
Word of God and the confessional standards of the Evangelical Lutheran church as drawn
from the Sacred Scriptures and contained in the Book of Concord." Id. at 669-70.







Unsurprisingly, the court looked to Hosanna-Tabor for guidance be-
cause it had similar facts. Herzog characterized Hosanna-Tabor as focus-
ing on four factors: whether the institution held the person to be a
minister, the theological training of the employee, whether the employee
self-identifies as a minister, and whether the job duties played a role in
conveying the church's message and carrying out its mission.11 3 In an
anti-climactic analysis, Herzog applied the minister label, finding that the
school classified the employee as a minister, the employee had studied
theology and self-identified as a minister, and her teaching duties, includ-
ing teaching religion and leading some devotional practices were suffi-
cient for being a minister.1 14 For the Herzog court, the last factor seems
to be doing most of the work, as it suggests a strong link between the
employee's responsibilities and the religious aspects of the message of the
educational institution.
Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend Inc. 115 involved similar facts
but resulted in a different outcome. The District Court in Herx also em-
phasized the four factors that the Herzog court pulled from Hosanna-
Tabor.116 But unlike that plaintiff, the Herx plaintiff did not have any
theological training or self-identify as a minister.1, 7 Further, and perhaps
most importantly, the employee's participation in religious services did
not extend beyond supervision of the students at the services.11 8 The last
point led the court to qualify the fourth factor from Hosanna-Tabor by
finding that mere supervision of religious activities, as a teacher, is not
the same as spiritual participation in those same activities.119 Participa-
tion involves spiritual contributions to the overall religious message of
the entity whereas mere presence simply makes propagation of that mes-
sage easier in a logical sense. Interestingly, this seems to mirror the Davis
case above in its rejection of formalistic logic; both hold that mere associ-
ation with a religious entity, or employment by a religious entity, cannot
carry the day itself, especially when the employee's activities are not ex-
clusively religious.120 This logic has been extended to non-teachers in re-
ligiously affiliated schools as well.121
113. Id. at 673.
114. Id. at 673.
115. 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
116. Id. at *7-8.
117. Id. at *8.
118. Id.
119. Id. ("Labeling Mrs. Herx a 'minister' based on her attendance and participation in
prayer and religious services with her students, which was done in a supervisory capacity,
would greatly expand the scope of the ministerial exception and ultimately would qualify
all of the Diocese's teachers as ministers, a position rejected by the Hosanna-Tabor
court .... [it] would moot the religious exemptions of Title VII.").
120. See Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind.
2014); Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701 (D. Md. 2013).
121. See, e.g., Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (refusing to accept notion that a teacher at a sectarian school is
automatically a minister by virtue of employment at a religiously affiliated school). It is
important to note that both the Herx and Dias cases involved plaintiffs who did not have
theological training and who did not self-identify as ministers while employed. In this re-
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Interesting results have occurred within the higher education setting,
namely at colleges and seminaries. Two cases were decided by the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky around the same time and involve the same
employer and tenured professors: Kirby v. Lexington Theological Semi-
nary122 and Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary.123 These cases rival
any other in terms of analytical depth for who qualifies as a minister and
provide a unique opportunity to assess how a court treats similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs with slightly different attributes that make all the
difference.
At Lexington Theological Seminary, faculty members were expected to
"serve as models for ministry," prepare "faithful leaders," and "partici-
pate in formal Seminary events."'1 24 The faculty also was "expected," but
not required to participate in Seminary worship services and convoca-
tions.125 Kirby adopted the ministerial exception as a matter of state law
when an employee is directly involved in promulgating and espousing the
tenets of the employer's faith.126 The "contribution to the message" as-
pect of the doctrine, according to the court, is why Hosanna-Tabor fo-
cuses on the four factors mentioned above. 127 Those factors relate to
conveying the mission of an entity because they involve how the entity
classifies the individual and how the individual represents or does not
represent the entity. Kirby involved a tenured professor who taught
Christian Social Ethics, who, as "a professor at an ecumenical Seminary,
instructing on Christian principles, serv[ed] as a representative of the
Seminary's message.' 28 Representing the entity in a fashion that con-
veyed its overall religious message was the linchpin of the analysis and
allowed the court to classify the tenured professor as a minister.
With that said, the Kirby court called for increased analysis under the
four factors referenced in Hosanna- Tabor, stating that more discussion of
the "actual acts or functions conducted by the employee would be pru-
dent."'1 29 This is another example of a court attempting to provide clarity
after Hosanna-Tabor. Fortunately, the Kirby court took a crack at the
problem, arguing that inquiries should probe deeper into the four factors
gard, it is unclear how significant those attributes were for the plaintiff in Herzog. With
that said, both Herx and Dias seem to suggest that courts are considering the fourth factor
in Hosanna-Tabor, namely how the employee affects the entity's mission, integral to any
analysis of whether an individual is a minister or not. See also Hough v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Erie, No. 12-253, 2014 WL 834473 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 4, 2014) (holding that the
testimony of Vicar of Education within the archdiocese that former teachers were ministers
by virtue of being teachers was insufficient, alone, to qualify someone as a minister within
the exception).
122. 426 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014).
123. Id.
124. Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 602-03 (Ky. 2014).
125. Id. at 603.
126. Id. The Kirby opinion does not make it clear why the Kentucky Supreme Court
felt compelled to make this announcement because, after all, the ministerial exception is
part of the First Amendment, which is applicable to the states.
127. Id. at 612.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 613 (citing J. Alito's concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor).
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offered by the Supreme Court because the "amalgam of secular and relig-
ious duties ... necessitat[es] a highly malleable method of determining
whether an employee is a minister.' 130 Specifically, related to titles given
by the entity, courts should ask whether the employee's title suggests that
he or she represented the entity on matters of faith.' 3' This would involve
analyzing the responsibilities associated with the title, including whether
they carry substantial religious significance, involved supervision or par-
ticipation in ritual and worship, or spread the tenets or doctrine of the
faith.132 Additionally, inquiries into the functions of an employee should
gauge whether the responsibilities were essentially liturgical, closely re-
lated to the doctrine of the institution, resulted in the personification of
the religious institution's beliefs, or were performed in the presence of
the faith community. 133 This is the Kirby court's attempt at putting meat
on the bones of the four factors; these additions suggest emphasizing how
an individual represents and contributes to the internal, spiritual liveli-
hood of the institution as a whole.' 34
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided another case,
involving a tenured professor, differently, at roughly the same time. In
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, the tenured professor was not a
minister because the professor did not espouse the tenets of the entity,
either through the professor's daily duties, such as teaching, or at formal
events. 135 Notably, the professor was Jewish and taught historical and re-
ligious subjects.136 He did not participate in significant religious func-
tions, proselytize on behalf of the seminary, or represent the seminary
other than through teaching. 137 The Court followed its reasoning in
Kirby, holding that simple promotion of mission, "alone, provides little
insight into whether the duties or responsibilities undertaken by the em-
ployee 'carried substantial religious significance.' '"138 Allowing that, or
"categorical application of the ministerial exception that would treat all
130. Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 613 (Ky. 2014).
131. Id. at 613-14 ("'[The employee's] own use of the title' should include considera-
tion of whether the position involved, expected, or required proselytizing on behalf of the
religious institution. Or did the employee use the title in a manner that would indicate to
the members of the particular faith community or to the public that he was a representative
of the religious institution authorized to speak on church doctrine?").
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Kirby court's attempt at supplementing the doctrine occurs in the context of
analyzing whether an employee at an admittedly religious entity is a minister. Arguably, this
tempers the language it uses when outlining its approach. As will be discussed later, it
makes sense to link the analytical inquiries within the ministerial exception, but any such
link must account for the diversity of religious entities that exists. Therefore, any metric by
which to measure who is a minister cannot be unduly restrictive in the sense that it links
the quality of being a minister to what ministers do or how they are classified in a particu-
lar religious entity, such as a church. Arguably, the Kirby court emphasizes the liturgical
and worship aspects of ministry to a fault.
135. See generally Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2014).
136. Id. at 591-92.
137. Id. at 589, 594.
138. Id. at 594 (citing Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597,613-14
(Ky. 2014)).
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seminary professors as ministers under the law," would render the excep-
tion meaningless. 139 Rather, the Court requires the conduct that pro-
motes the mission of an entity to be linked to the "tenets of the religious
institution's faith."'1 40 In other words, "a minister, in the commonly un-
derstood sense, has a very close relationship with the doctrine of the re-
ligious institution the minister represents.' 14 ' This is why "the members
of the congregation or faith community view a minister as one who is,
among other things, the face of the religious institution, permitted to
speak for the religious institution, the embodiment of the religious insti-
tution's tenets, and leader of the religious institution's ritual.' 42 For the
professor in question, there was a distinction between teaching religion
and teaching about religion. 143 Further, the professor's personal attrib-
utes precluded a close relationship to the doctrinal tenets of the institu-
tion because as a member of the Jewish community the professor could
not be said to personify the institution's doctrine.' a The absence of litur-
gical functions within the entity was only the icing on the cake.
3. Cases at Parachurches, Non-Profit, and Religiously-Affiliated
Entities
Non-profit employers have been found to contain ministers, which
does not differ significantly from pre-Hosanna-Tabor jurisprudence. 145
Some religiously affiliated non-profits, such as subsidiaries of larger relig-
ious entities or missions, have been found to contain ministers in a fash-
ion that is similar to a church because they are in the business of
promoting a particular message. 146 In these situations, courts are classify-
ing employees as ministers when those employees engage in spiritual ac-
tivities or are instrumental in conveying the message of the entity or the
larger entity, even if the responsibilities of the job are not inherently re-
ligious.' 47 Furthermore, employees who represent a religious entity, even
139. Id. at 588.
140. Id. at 594.
141. Id. at 592.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 594-95.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Hope Int'l
Univ. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 719 (2004); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare,
Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) (hospital workers); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop
of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003) (press secretary); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese
of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) (director of music ministry at local cathedral
elementary school); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (choir director).
146. See, e.g., Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship USA, 13 F. Supp. 3d 782(W.D. Mich. 2014) (spiritual director for staff members conceded that she was a minister
and court appeared to agree). InterVarsity Christian Fellowship's main goal is to evangel-
ize college campuses. See InterVarsity, Our Vision, INTERVARSITY CHRISTIAN FEL-
LOWSHIP USA, https://intervarsity.org/about/our/our-vision [http://perma.cc/Q48P-55
3D].
147. See Mills v. Standing Comm'n on Christian Unity, 958 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
2013) (involving general secretary in ecumenical agency established by the church proper);
Fisher v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 6 N.E.3d. 1254 (Ct. App. Ohio 2014) (involving ceme-
tery director of cemetery owned by the Archdiocese).
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while engaging in activities that are not exclusively religious, still may be
helping to convey the entity's message. 148 Hence, an employee who en-
gages in secular duties within a religiously affiliated agency can still be a
minister "if his job duties 'reflected a role in conveying the Church's mes-
sage and carrying out its mission.'" 149 Why courts are more open to in-
cluding these types of employees at non-profits than at educational
institutions is unclear.
More interestingly, ministers also have been located in settings that are
not exclusively religious but maintain religious affiliation, such as hospi-
tals.150 In Penn v. N. Y Methodist, the employee engaged in pastoral care
at the hospital, distributing religious texts and conducting memorial ser-
vices. 151 The employee also identified as a minister.1 52 And the employee
had been hired specifically to engage in ministry activities within the hos-
pital. 1 53 Thus, as existed pre-Hosanna-Tabor,154 employers that are not
exclusively religious, and that maintain fewer institutional religious activi-
ties than schools, may maintain ministers post-Hosanna- Tabor.
The cases in the above discussion represent the most significant pro-
nouncements to date regarding the application of Hosanna-Tabor to dif-
ferent circumstances. They serve as evidence that courts are struggling to
define the precise point at which an employee affects conveying an en-
tity's mission "enough." By implication, they also suggest that linking the
definition of minister to the "message" of an institution, without paying
particular attention to the other, non-message sending activities of an en-
tity may lead to lack of clarity or inconsistent results. In other words,
perhaps the definition of who qualifies as a minister should be more cog-
nizant of the involved entity's entire operation, not just what it communi-
cates. Before unpacking that further, however, the next part addresses
which entities have been found by courts to be capable of even invoking
the exception in the first place.
B. TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ENTITIES POST-HOSANNA-TABOR
Various kinds of self-declared religious entities have attempted to in-
voke the exception following Hosanna-Tabor. Courts have easily ac-
knowledged bona fide churches and houses of worship as capable of
claiming the exception.1 55 The same is true for religiously affiliated
148. Fisher v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 6 N.E. 3d 1254, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
149. Id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 708 (2012)).
150. Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-CV-9137, 2013 WL 5477600 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2013). But see Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys., 317 P.3d 1009, 1026 n.4 (Wash. 2014)
(suggesting that case involving a desk clerk responsible for administering nametags at a
Catholic hospital did not involve the ministerial exception).
151. Penn, 2013 WL 5477600, at *6.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007).
155. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012) (par-
ish that was part of the archdiocese); Ginyard v. Church of God in Christ, Inc., No. 3:13-
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schools. 156 But, interestingly, in Herzog and Herx, the plaintiff sued both
the church and the school, and the district courts chose to combine both
for analytical purposes. 157 In other words, those courts did not engage in
an analysis about a possible distinction between the types of entities
within the ministerial exception doctrine. This analytical oversight, inten-
tional or not, confirms that at least some courts have not considered-out
loud-whether some entities are beyond the exception or whether the ex-
ception is very inclusive. The cases discussed below demonstrate that
courts are struggling with how to classify self-declared religious entities.
The blurriest cases occur with religiously-affiliated entities that are not
linked to a larger religious apparatus, are linked to a less traditional relig-
ious entity or belief system, or that maintain a mission that does not re-
strict the entity's work service to adherents. These entities, or
"parachurches," often come in the form of non-profit organizations.
Thus, InterVarsity, a fairly well-known Christian-based fellowship organi-
zation that primarily engages in mission work on college campuses, at-
tempted to invoke the exception. 158 Although the plaintiff conceded the
entity's religious qualities, and therefore the Western District Court of
Michigan was not tasked with analyzing the question, the court cited pre-
Hosanna-Tabor authority for the notion that untraditional religious enti-
ties can qualify for the ministerial exception. 159 The citation involved
Hollins v. Methodist Health Care Inc.,160 which involved a religiously-af-
filiated hospital system that engages in tons of non-exclusively religious
activities. As such, the court seemed to communicate that parachurches,
and analogous entities, are contemplated by the exception.
The Sixth Circuit confirmed this approach on appeal and arguably wid-
ened it by articulating its reasoning in greater detail.161 Interestingly, it
acknowledged that Hosanna-Tabor involved a "church," but InterVarsity
CV-931-H, 2014 WL 1089625 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 14, 2014) (Pentecostal church); Davis v. Bal-
timore Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701 (D. Md. 2013) (synagogue); Saunders v.
Richardson, No. 5:12-CV-511-FL, 2013 WL 4008184 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2013) (African
Methodist Episcopal Church); Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357
(Wash. 2012) (recognizing church, at bottom of religious hierarchy, as part of larger relig-
ious institution); DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 2012) (Catho-
lic parish in the Archdiocese of Milwaukee).
156. See, e.g., Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(Lutheran parochial school that is connected to the church proper); Herx v. Diocese of Ft.
Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (Catholic parochial school);
Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
29, 2012) (plaintiff conceded that Catholic parochial school was a religious institution).
157. Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. I1. 2012) (Lu-
theran parochial school that is connected to the church proper); Herx v. Diocese of Ft.
Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (Catholic parochial school).
158. Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship USA, 13 F. Supp. 3d 782 (W.D. Mich.
2014).
159. Id. at 781 (citing Hollins v. Methodist Health Care, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir.
2007)).
160. 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007).
161. Conlon, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 833-34.
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is a "'religious group' under Hosanna-Tabor.'' 162 Again, the court cited
Hollins for this broad reading of religious institution.163 Specifically, the
court stated that "the ministerial exception's applicability does not turn
on its being tied to a specific denominational faith; it applies to multide-
nominational and nondenominational religious organizations as well." 64
Citing the Fourth Circuit, the court stated that a religious entity is one
"'whose mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteris-
tics.' 165 InterVarsity's "Christian name" and "mission of Christian minis-
try and teaching" were enough.166 Noticeably, the court did not probe the
contents of InterVarsity's self-proclaimed Christian ministry and
mission.167
Despite the existence of Hollins pre-Hosanna-Tabor, the status of re-
ligiously affiliated non-profit hospitals is another area of the doctrine that
is less than steady at the moment. The most notable case post-Hosanna-
Tabor, Penn v. N.Y. Methodist,168 involved a hospital that was a member
of the Presbyterian Healthcare System.169 The hospital had a long history
of affiliation with a church, although that link was allegedly severed in the
1970s.170 It also continued to maintain a separate Pastoral Care Depart-
ment and employed ministers from a host of religions.' 71 The Southern
District of New York acknowledged, from the outset, that invocation of
the ministerial exception requires a two-step analysis. 172 For the court,
the hospital's decision to sever relations with the church undermined its
case for remaining a religious entity. 73 With that said, the court remained
open to the possibility; its decision was based entirely on the allegations
in the plaintiff's complaint.' 74
Higher educational institutions that maintain religious affiliations are
seeking to utilize the exception. Several state courts have struggled with
162. Id. at 834. Again, the astute reader will notice the incorporation of the terms used
interchangeable in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hosanna-Tabor.
163. Id. at 782 ("[W]e have previously held that a Methodist hospital is a 'clearly relig-
ious organization' for First Amendment purposes.").
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310
(4th Cir. 2004) ("applying the ministerial exception to a Jewish nursing home")).
166. Id.
167. See Murray, supra note 18, at 523-24 (discussing the problems with total deference
to deferring to an entity's self-characterization given the demands of Smith).
168. Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-CV-9137, 2013 WL 5477600 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2013).
169. Id. at *1.
170. Id. at *8.
171. Id. It is unclear whether having ministers from multiple religions as part of the
Pastoral Care Department aided the hospital's argument. One can see how it could, on the
one hand, undermine the hospital's case for classification as a religious institution. Employ-
ing members of various faiths could be seen as an attempt to dilute the religious character
of the hospital. On the other hand, it could be seen as an amplification of the religious
character of the entity.
172. Id. In fact, the court acknowledged how "the Supreme Court did not question
whether the church-owned school was a religious group for purposes of the ministerial
exception." Id. at *7.
173. Id. at *8.
174. Id.
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whether these entities are close enough to parent churches or other insti-
tutions to warrant protection. Winbery v. Louisiana College,175 an inter-
mediate state court case in Louisiana, contains a detailed reflection on
both ministerial exception inquiries. Notably, it is one of the few post-
Hosanna-Tabor decisions that recognize that the exception involves two-
sub questions. 176 Louisiana College, a liberal arts institution, sought to
insulate itself after terminating the employment of certain faculty and
staff members. 177 The Plaintiff cited EEOC v. Mississippi College178 as
support for its assertion that the college could not invoke the excep-
tion.179 The state court distinguished Mississippi College, which involved
a liberal arts institution that was owned and operated by the Baptist Con-
vention, which in turn consisted of Baptist churches.' 80 Furthermore,
Louisiana College did not have a direct affiliation with a church like the
primary school in Hosanna-Tabor.18 ' In short, the absence of a direct link
to a recognizable religious entity, like a church, was fatal. The existence
of a history of affiliation was not enough. This seems to be in line with the
assumed reasoning in Herzog182 and Herx,183 but the lack of analysis in
those cases prevents a firm conclusion.
The Kirby court, discussed in detail above with respect to its reasoning
about who may qualify as a minister, also attempted to clarify which types
of entities can invoke the exception. Kirby involved an accredited gradu-
ate theological institution of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ). 184
The institution's goal was to prepare "faithful leaders for the Church of
Jesus Christ."'1 85 It received funding from the church, maintained a cove-
nant with the church, and had to agree to support the total mission of the
church. 186 After explicitly stating that the "ministerial exception requires
two main inquiries," including "is the employer a religious institution,"
Kirby held that "an entity, allegedly religiously affiliated, will be consid-
ered a 'religious institution' for purposes of the ministerial exception
'whenever that entity's mission is marked by clear or obvious religious
characteristics.'"187 Classifying the entity's mission, rather than its func-
tions or activities, was the dominant feature for the Kirby court.' 88 Direct
175. 124 So. 3d 1212 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
176. Id. at 1215 ("[I]n order for Defendants to garner the protection of the ministerial
exception, two findings are required: (1) that the institution in question is a church; and (2)
that the plaintiffs are ministers of that church.").
177. Id. at 1213-14.
178. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
179. Winbery, 124 So. 3d at 1214-15.
180. Id. at 1216.
181. Id. (citing the trial court opinion).
182. Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Ind. 2012).
183. Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind.
2014).
184. Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 602 (Ky. 2014).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 609.
187. Id.
188. Contra Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Soc'y, Inc. v. Bridgewater ex rel
Bridge, 990 N.E.2d 29, 33, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a private, non-profit organ-
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relationship to a church proper provided the "obvious religious character-
istics" because the church has an obvious religious mission.189 That type
of reasoning also allowed a cemetery owned by the Archdiocese of Cin-
cinnati to invoke the exception because the purpose of the entity was
intrinsically religious as it related to Catholic burial rituals, which were
extension of the mission of the Church overall. 190 But astute observers
will notice that the Kirby court failed to note how a mission contains
obvious religious characteristics.' 9 '
If there is one takeaway from the paucity of case law entertaining
whether an entity is even capable of maintaining ministers, it is that the
question needs more attention because it would seem that the answer to
the first inquiry could helpfully inform the second inquiry. Put differently,
the classification of an entity in terms of its religious characteristics and
non-religious characteristics informs the type of ministry that the entity
maintains, which in turn would inform which employees are actually con-
nected to that particular ministry. Such an approach could be useful for
the most difficult cases that involve the religiously-affiliated entities, with
apparent and defined "religious" missions, that also simultaneously en-
gage in activities that many non-religious entities also pursue on a daily
basis. It is possible that these "hybrid" entities are out of luck and cannot
maintain ministers. It also could be the case that these entities can main-
tain a lot more ministers because of the potential relationship between an
employee and the mission, however attenuated. But a third option could
be that entities maintain ministers to the extent that the employee's titles,
ization that receives charitable funding and has religious, educational, and social features
for home-schooled students is not a religious employer under Hosanna-Tabor because its
primary function was education-related).
189. Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 608.
190. Fisher v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 6 N.E. 3d 1254, 1256 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)("[A] manifestly religious institution established for the sacred purpose of carrying out the
liturgical rite of Catholic burial and the subsequent care of the burial spaces.").
191. Defining "religious characteristics," or "religion," has had its share of treatment by
legal scholars. See, e.g., Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1056, 1063 n.51 (1978); Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First
Amendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEx. L. REV. 139, 150 (1982); Kent Greenawalt,
Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 789 (1984). The Su-
preme Court has recognized the special constitutional status of religion, but has generally
conceded broad definitions, likely due to cognizance of the Establishment Clause. See
United States v. Welsh, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Various circuit courts have attempted to define "religious institution" for purposes of Title
VII. See, e.g., Spencer v. World Vision, 619 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) ("There is no
dispute that the Employees were fired for religious reasons. For purposes of this appeal,
such termination was permissible if-and only if-World Vision is a 'religious corporation,
association .... or society' under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). Our only inquiry, therefore, is a
de novo review of the district court's summary judgment that World Vision qualifies for the
exemption."); Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr., 503 F.3d 217, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2007);
Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 200 (11th Cir. 1997). For my own thoughts on
how to define entities for purposes of the ministerial exception given other aspects of thejurisprudence of the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, see Murray, supra note 21,
at 525-28 (calling for a rebuttable presumption of religiousness that is evaluated by reason-
able analogy to obviously religious entities and that also contains a sincerity element).
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activities, and functions mirror the form, type, and religious functions of
the underlying institution.
III. CONNECTING THE TWO INQUIRIES
Part II communicates that courts are struggling to define who may
qualify as a minister, particularly at institutions that are not churches but
that maintain religious attributes and that engage in activities that are not
exclusively religious but may be motivated in part by religion. Finding the
magical line had been the project of courts for decades before Hosanna-
Tabor and it appears that project is far from over.192 This Part suggests
that the difficulty arises due to the failure of those courts to properly and
thoroughly analyze the form, mission, and functions of the entity that
seeks to invoke the exception and then correlate those attributes to the
minister inquiry. The sparse guidance in Hosanna-Tabor only involves
the attributes of a minister and only, impliedly at best, suggests that
courts remain mindful of the type of institution that employs the em-
ployee. 193 While the Court emphasizes the need for flexibility, some of
the factors it chooses to mention lean towards liturgical religious activity,
which is only one small part of the universe of religious activity. 194 The
divergent results at similar institutions-for example in Herx and
Herzog-reflect how the guidance offered by the Court has confused the
lower courts. 95 Both opinions focus on the religious activities of the indi-
vidual, rather than locating them within the larger institutional whole.' 96
In other words, rather than focusing on the individual activities of the
employee in question, and whether they are religious, courts should con-
sider connecting the definition of minister inquiry more directly to the
nature of the entity that seeks to claim an employee as a minister. Who
qualifies as a minister depends first on the type of ministry that the entity
engages in, not simply the individual religious activities of the minister
within the entity, as characterized by looking at a few possible factors.
Comprehending the religious attributes of an entity will allow courts to
determine whether the employee's responsibilities correlate to those re-
ligious attributes that make the entity a religious institution in the first
place.
It is important to note that this is not the same as classifying entities in
terms of religiosity, which is likely beyond the purview of courts given the
Establishment Clause. 197 Rather, the goal is identifying the precise relig-
ious attributes possessed by a particular entity in order to delineate what
192. See Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Ho-
sanna-Tabor, 108 Nw. U. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (2014) ("[T]here is simply no natural point of
differentiation between ministers and non-ministers.").
193. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 697.
194. Id. at 706, 707-08.
195. Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-South Bend Ind., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind.
2014); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Ind. 2012).
196. Herx, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1177; Herzog, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74.
197. See Spencer v. World Vision, 619 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010).
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that entity attempts to do as an institutional whole, and therefore what
ministers within that organization are primarily tasked with doing. Ad-
mittedly, identifying the religious elements of an entity is a difficult
task. 198 But focusing on the religious attributes of the institution allows
for differentiating between the ministerial activities of a church and a re-
ligiously affiliated school, which can be substantively different.
Once courts focus precisely on the specific religious characteristics of
an entity, and how that entity seeks to act as an institutional whole, who
exists as a minister comes into better focus as courts can search for
whether the employee's activities correlate to the religious characteristics
possessed by the entity in question. Perhaps this may be called the entity-
minister correlation approach. It squares with Hosanna-Tabor on its face,
which emphasizes how the minister inquiry is linked to the mission of the
entity. 199 But it goes a step further, by recognizing that missions take vari-
ous shapes and forms and vary according to the entity. A church has an
intrinsically different mission from a religiously affiliated school, even
though some aspects of the missions of both may overlap. But neverthe-
less, each has its own mission and objectives and pursues those objectives,
institutionally, in different ways. Therefore, it only makes sense that the
employees whose responsibilities mirror the unique religious characteris-
tics of the mission be classified as ministers. Employees with responsibili-
ties that fail to parallel the entity's unique attributes would exist beyond
the minister label. This is why Hosanna-Tabor refers to "those who will
personify [the entity's] beliefs. '200
This approach manifests itself in some of the cases identified above.
Thus, a piano player may be classified as a minister because contributions
to the music aspects of a message-based worship ministry within a church
or house of worship are indicative of promoting the main objective of the
entity: communicating a religious message.20 ' Churches-in the proper
sense of the term-are primarily in the business of spreading a religious
message during worship opportunities and sometimes outside of them.
That explains why janitorial and support staff employees at churches are
not ministers: their responsibilities do not mirror the entity's ministry ac-
tivity because they do not help communicate a religious message in any
real sense, precisely because the work done by the employee does not
mirror the objectives of the institution. 20 2 Alternatively, in the case of the
198. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 190-93 (2014) (identifying ways in which courts
and commentators have tried to define religious institutions in various contexts, including
by analogy to churches, the structure of the institution in question, the not-for-profit status
of the entity, and the perspectives of employees). Some scholars also have attempted to
locate the analysis by pointing to implied consent doctrines. See Michael A. Helfand, What
is a Church? Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES,
401, 409, 424-25 (2013).
199. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 708 (2012).
200. Id. at 706.
201. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177 (5th Cir. 2012).
202. Interestingly, tort causation concepts might be useful to help explain this idea. De-
fining who is a minister in a but-for causation sense would be overbroad because just as
there are an infinite number of but-for causes of any particular event, there could, in the-
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piano player, his responsibilities mirror the institutional religious activity:
communication of the Gospel, especially within a worship setting.
But the helpfulness of this new approach is most apparent in the relig-
iously affiliated school context, an arena where defining the boundaries
of the ministerial exception is the most difficult given the fact that educa-
tion is not an exclusively religious activity. After Hosanna-Tabor, courts
are tasked with looking at the employee's title, the substance reflected in
the title, the employee's use of the title, and the functions performed for
the entity.203 But these factors are too broad and treat entities as the
same in form, which is of course not the case when considering the
unique and distinct missions of a church or temple versus a school. Titles
vary across the board and the theological training that may be sufficient
for a minister in one type of religious entity is different than in another
entity. Additionally, the focus by lower courts on whether the employee
helps convey a message fails to appreciate that not all religious entities
have message sending as their primary objective. Finally, the missions of
entities vary in form, depth, and scope as well. In short, while the factors
maintain the guise of flexibility, through a totality of the circumstances
type inquiry, they simultaneously mask a one-size-fits-all approach.
But those factors are a start; they simply need to be tempered by cogni-
zance of the variation in form amongst religious entities, particularly edu-
cational entities. The entity-minister correlation proposal would define
ministers at religiously-affiliated schools as those employees who main-
tain responsibilities that parallel the institutional religious activities of the
school and, that, in fact, contribute to the entity's institutional religious
activity as an institution. For example, employees who engage in prayer
or other religious activity as an overarching institutional exercise may be
classified as ministers. In other words, when a school employee engages
in responsibilities that directly cause or contribute to institutional relig-
ious activity as a whole, not simply religious activity within the institution,
that employee enters the possible minister discussion. The factors within
Hosanna-Tabor can serve as guidance, in addition to others, when deter-
mining whether the employee affects institutional activity.
Again, something like this reasoning appears in the distinction between
the outcomes in the Kant and Kirby cases from the Supreme Court of
Kentucky. Whereas the professor in Kirby represented the school at insti-
tutional functions and engaged in religious activities at those functions,
sometimes overseeing them entirely, the professor in Kant only partici-
pated in institutional activities. 20 4 But whereas the Kirby court seems to
ory, be an infinite number of ministers, the existence of which affected the entity's action
as a whole. The better approach is to require a proximate connection between the minister
and the entity's activity, focusing on responsibility for the entity's action. Application of
proximate causation definitions to whether a particular employee's actions "cause" the
institution to act religiously might be worth additional attention.
203. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
204. See Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 611-13 (Ky. 2014);
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587, 595 (Ky. 2014) (recognizing that
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focus on the fact that the professor "represented" the seminary, 05 the
correlation approach goes one step further. Instead of focusing on
whether the employee is a representative of the institution, the inquiry
should be whether the employee acts in such a fashion that affects the
direction or religious activity of the institution as an entity.2 06 In other
words, when the purported minister acts, is the institution engaging in
institutional ministerial activity? Being a representative might be one way
of doing that, but representation often involves message sending, which,
again, is only one way in which an entity acts religiously. Thus, represen-
tation cannot be the linchpin. Rather, the question is whether the em-
ployee's act synchronizes with institutional religious activity in such a way
that it could be said that the institution is acting when the employee is
acting.
This approach makes sense of the fact that some religious entities,
other than churches, engage in activities that are not exclusively relig-
ious. 20 7 Therefore, when an employee engages in religious activity at such
an entity that causes or contributes to that entity, as a whole, engaging in
the same religious activity, that employee might be classified as a minis-
ter, or more appropriately said, as acting in a ministerial fashion, all
things considered. When an employee engages in activity that does not
"move" the institution toward religious activity connected to the mission,
that action is not ministerial, and that employee might not be a minister.
"Might" is the operative word because the Court's aspiration for flexibil-
ity after Hosanna-Tabor requires an examination of particular circum-
professor participated in religious activities but that he did not have a "relationship with
the tenets of the Seminary's faith"). The Kentucky Supreme Court's language in Kant
evinces reasoning similar to my proposal. It emphasizes how the professor "did not play
'an important role in transmitting the [Seminary's] faith to the next generation."' Kant, 426S.W.3d at 595. In other words, the professor's responsibilities did not parallel the institu-
tion's main responsibility-communicating a religious message. While the professor en-gaged in religious activities within the institution, those activities did not coordinate,
entirely, with the institution's activities. Hence, Kant ends with this: "[T]he functions per-
formed by Kant were not liturgical, did not personify the Seminary's beliefs, and were not
performed in the presence of the faith community .... [t]he nature of Kant's work...
serves as the basis for the determination that Kant is not a minister." Id. This quote ap-
pears within a discussion about the employer's tenets. Id.
205. Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 612.
206. For a variation of this approach regarding churches, see Mark Steiner, Who is a
Minister? Broadening the Scope of the Ministerial Exception After Hosanna-Tabor, 60
WAYNE L. REv. 261, 275 (2014) ("[L]ower courts should consider not just the duties of
religious officials, but put a greater weight on the ability of the employee, through the
exercise of religious judgments, to influence the religious experience of individual mem-
bers of their church."). Whereas Steiner's objective appears to be broadening the defini-
tion for employees within churches, this Article's approach, while accomplishing that goal,
also makes a workable framework for entities that engage in activities that are not exclu-
sively religious, namely schools. But Steiner's overall objective regarding churches makes
sense in light of the fact that churches are the most obviously religious entities, thereby
warranting the most autonomy based on the Religion Clauses. That is an assertion thathistory supports as well considering that the rise of parachurches is a relatively recent
phenomenon.
207. See generally Roger W. Dyer, Qualifying for the Title VII Religious Organization
Exemption: Federal Circuits Split Over Proper Test, 76 Mo. L. REv. 76 (2010) (discussing
various tests for determining whether an organization is "religious").
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stances, and this proposal does not disturb that.20 8
It also is important to remember that institutional activity can be either
inward looking or external. So, in the school context, a teacher who leads
the entire school's prayer ceremony, or other religious activity that in-
volves the entire community, is presumptively acting like a minister, re-
gardless of whether the purpose of the activity is to cater to one's flock
versus evangelization or message sending to a broader community. In ei-
ther context, the teacher's action personifies the institution's religious ac-
tivity because institutional religious activity occurs when the individual
teacher acts. In contrast, a teacher who recites a morning prayer at the
beginning of each day is not automatically a minister because that teacher
is engaging in religious activity within the institution but not necessarily
acting institutionally. 20 9
Most importantly, the correlation approach is consistent with the doc-
trinal basis for the exception, namely an appreciation for institutional re-
ligious autonomy and the space that institutions should have to operate in
society, both externally and internally. 210 Institutional religious autonomy
is a foundational aspect of the free exercise of religion and its basis comes
from the recognition that mediating institutions often contribute to soci-
ety in ways that the state cannot, and, perhaps more importantly, limit the
208. As mentioned earlier, it is likely that the Establishment Clause requires a circum-
stantial inquiry. Additionally, as Paul Horwitz writes, "[tihe nature and extent of judicial
deference should follow the nature of the institution." See Horwitz, supra note 12, at 1053.
209. It might be argued that this approach has a principal-agency feel to it, particularly
the identification of apparent authority for agents. The ambiguities and need for flexibility
in the ministerial exception (given other constitutional demands in the Religion Clauses)
suggest that apparent authority principles are somewhat analogous to this proposal. Ap-
parent authority normally exists when a principal manifests to a third party that the agent
is authorized to act on his behalf and the third party "reasonably" relies on the manifesta-
tion. 3 AM. JUR. 2D AGENCY § 71 (2015). The latter part of the definition corresponds to
finding liability and probably is not as relevant in this context. But the first part of the
definition might be instructive, as institutions that allow individuals to act in such a way
that reasonably indicates institutional activity, suggests a degree of apparent authority
within that institution. But the entity-minister correlation proposal is broader because it
accounts for the fact that not all ministers are in positions of authority. Said in another
way, plenty of figures who do not possess authority could be said to cause an institution to
act institutionally on a particular occasion. For example, the teacher in the above example
might only be a regular member of the faculty. But at the ceremony, the teacher is a mem-
ber of the faculty who is causing the institution to engage in prayer as an institution.
210. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702-05; see also Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious
Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REv. COL-
LOQUY 175, 175 (2011) ("For nearly a thousand years, the tradition of Western constitu-
tionalism-the project of protecting political freedom by marking boundaries to the power
of government-as has been strengthened by the principled commitment to religious lib-
erty and church-state separation."); Garnett, supra note 12, at 274; Paul Horwitz, Churches




reach of the state.211 In short, the "freedom of the church"2 12 is about
allowing institutions room to operate. The exception provides the requi-
site space for that type of authentic expression of the entity in society.
Institutional autonomy is about the ability of entities to participate freely
and offer their unique mission to society-without unnecessary confronta-
tion from the civil authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the ministerial exception protects external freedom and inter-
nal affairs simultaneously, the classification of ministers should reflect
how employees affect institutional religious activity as an institution,
namely external activity, not just whether the employee engaged in relig-
ious activity within the institution or the entity considers the individual to
be a minister. The latter approach mistakenly focuses the inquiry on indi-
vidual activity rather than remaining mindful of the connection between
that activity and the entity's mission and objectives. Put simply, ministers
are those employees that "move" their institutions to engage in institu-
tional religious behavior with the capacity to affect the entity's mission as
a whole. Employees that merely engage in some individual religious be-
havior within the entity, even at the suggestion of the institution, are not
necessarily ministers because they have not necessarily caused the institu-
tion to, as a whole, engage in religious activity. The entity's institutional
integrity is less at stake under those circumstances. But when an em-
ployee's activities correspond to the institutional religious activities,
whether as a representative or not, and the institution could be said to be
acting when the employee acts, that employee should be classified as a
minister.
211. See Berg et al., supra note 210, at 175 ("A community that respects both the im-
portance of, and the distinction between, independent spheres of political and religious
authority is one in which the fundamental rights of all are more secure. A government that
acknowledges this distinction acknowledges limits to its own reach. Such a government,
history shows, will more consistently protect and vindicate the liberties of both individuals
and institutions."); see also, Robinson, supra note 21, at 205 (noting how religious institu-
tions provide and "fulfill a unique and important role in our democracy" when justifying
significant constitutional protection for first-order religious institutions).
212. See Garnett, supra note 9, at 14-16; see Horwitz, supra note 12, at 1053 ("These
institutions developed alongside, and in some cases preexisted, the liberal state itself, and
have long been coordinate parts of our broader social structure. The state-and its limits-
formed with these institutions in mind. No mysticism is required to suggest that this might
be constitutionally relevant.").
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